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I. INTRODUCTION
A. POLICY ANALYSIS
POLICY MAKERS frequently find themselves looking for his-torical analogues to policies currently on the agenda. Previ-
ous changes in laws and regulations provide important lessons
for the formulation and implementation of new policies. These
examples can provide political ammunition during the policy
debate as supporters or opponents point to the results of previ-
ous efforts as "strong" or "compelling" evidence to support their
respective positions. Supporters search for evidence to suggest
that their favored policy is likely to result in positive outcomes,
while opponents hope to find examples that demonstrate the
failure of similar policies, or at least negative ramifications from
earlier, similar decisions.
A recent article by Boswell and Coats in this Journal entitled,
Saving the General Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to the Test,
TORT REFORM
follows this approach.' The authors offer a simple analytical
framework for understanding or testing tort reform. They ar-
gue that "[d] uring the 1980s tort lawsuits decimated the general
aviation industry."2 This is the same straightforward statement
of cause and effect voiced by aircraft manufacturers and their
major industry group-the General Aviation Manufacturers As-
sociation (GAMA). s Indeed, .the industry's campaign against
the products liability system was so effective that it has become
the conventional wisdom for many commentators, including
Boswell and Coats.4 According to the liability crisis thesis, the
onslaught of tort lawsuits caused the demise of America's gen-
eral aviation industry. Boswell and Coats conclude that general
aviation is "an ideal laboratory for tort reform."5 That is, the
causal links between tort lawsuits and the demise of the industry
are so clear that a reform of the tort laws in the case of the
general aviation industry will provide a good model for other
industries and segments of the economy. We disagree.
In this Paper we assess the assumptions and biases of argu-
ments like the one presented by Boswell and Coats. Assump-
tions and biases are important because they shape both the
analytical framework and the conclusions of the research. If the
assumptions are based on misinterpretations of the empirical ev-
idence or the normative interests of the researcher the conclu-
sions are likely to mislead. In the case of policy analysis, such
conclusions can lead to unwarranted political, economic, and
social costs.
Before any lessons about tort reform are learned in the wake
of the General Aviation Revitalization Act 6 (GARA), it is impor-
tant to examine the changing economic and political environ-
ment of the 1970s and early 1980s. Without a clear
understanding of other factors affecting both the decline of the
industry and its possible revitalization, it is nothing short of dan-
gerous to conclude that we really can learn anything about tort
reform. For example, if the assumption is that tort claims exclu-
sively caused the demise of the industry, then other explana-
John H. Boswell & George A. Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: Put-
ting Tort Reform to the Test, 60J. AIR L. & CoM. 533 (1994).
2 Id. at 535.
3 See, e.g., GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASS'N, LIABILITY REFORM FOR
GENERAL AVIATION: A NEED AT THE POINT OF CISiS 1 (1992) [hereinafter GAMA].
4 Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, passim.
5 Id. at 536.
6 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. V 1993).
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tions are ignored. Similarly, if this assumption is carried
forward and the industry revives after the passage of GARA and
other tort reform efforts, then other explanations for its recov-
ery are likely to be ignored or overlooked.
These kinds of conclusions are problematic for at least two
reasons. If tort lawsuits are given too much blame for the de-
mise and tort reform is given too. much credit in the event of a
revival, then the root problems affecting the industry and the
real sources of its revival are ignored. The same can be said if
the industry fails to revive despite tort reform. Without a better
understanding of other factors affecting the health of the indus-
try, tort reform might be unfairly labeled a failure. Given the
economic and social importance of tort reform efforts, such a
conclusion would have consequences well beyond the debate
about the fate of America's general aviation manufacturers.
It is not our intention to suggest that products liability lawsuits
did not have detrimental effects on America's general aviation
industry. It is, however, our contention that the effects of prod-
ucts liability on the decline of the industry and the ramifications
of tort reform in this area are not well understood. We merely
caution against using general aviation as a test for the" efficacy of
broader tort reform efforts that have been the subject of much
debate in Congress recently.7 In the balance, of this study, we
present a number of alternative explanations for the demise of
the industry and suggest several factors that are likely to affect
the industry's future. We begin with a brief description of the
general aviation industry and a review of the "liability crisis" as it
is called by industry officials and their supporters. We attempt
to offer a balanced account by presenting cases often cited by
tort reform advocates as well as some information that the indus-
try and its supporters successfully kept out of the debate.
7 On May 10, 1995, the U.S. Senate passed a products liability bill that would
set new federal limits on lawsuits against manufacturers and distributors of faulty
products. Whether the bill becomes law remains a wide-open question to be de-
termined by House-Senate conferees and eventually the President, who has
promised to veto the stronger House version that would place caps on punitive
damage awards in all civil suits. See Richard B. Schmitt, Product-Liability Bill Heads
to Conferees, WALL ST.J., May 11, 1995, at B6.
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B. THE AMERICAN GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
General aviation is an important part of the transportation
sector and the broader economy.8 Operators of general aviation
aircraft provide a variety of aviation services, such as pilot train-
ing, crop-dusting, and emergency medical evacuation that are
not efficiently provided by alternative modes of transportation.
General aviation aircraft also provide passenger service in areas
that commercial airlines are unwilling or unable to service.9
The importance of the industry does not stop with the kinds
of service provided by the operators of single and multi-engine
aircraft. The industry is a major contributor to the nation's
economy through the production, sale, and service of an enor-
mous fleet of aircraft that serves over 120 million people annu-
ally.10  When finance, flight instruction, insurance,
maintenance, and other services are included, the industry con-
tributes over $40 billion to the national economy and provides
more than 540,000jobs.1 Approximately seventy-five percent of




The field of products liability law developed almost exclusively
in the United States over the last half-century.13 . The generally
accepted legal definition of the term is the "liability of a manu-
facturer or seller of a chattel which is defective and/or unrea-
sonably dangerous and causes injuries to persons." 4 There are
at least four objectives of liability law: to compensate victims of
accidents, to deter injurers, to spread risk equitably, and to fos-
8 See, e.g., ALEXANDER T. WELLS, AIR TRANSPORTATION: A MANAGEMENT PERSPEC-
TIVE (2d ed. 1984).
9 Id.
10 Industry, NASA, the FAA, and Universities Join Forces to Revitalize the General Avia-
tion Industy, AGATE FLIER, Aug. 1994, at 1.
ii FAA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND ANNUAL FAA GENERAL AVIATION FORE-
CAST CONFERENCE (1992).
12 R.L. Swanda, Light General Aviation, in FUTURE AVIATION ACTIVITIES: PROCEED-
INGS OF THE SIXTH INTERNATIONAL WORKSHOP OF THE TRANSPORTATION RESEARCH
BOARD (1990).
Is THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVA-
TION 1 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991) [hereinafter LIABILITY
MAZE].
14 WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 641 (4th ed. 1971).
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ter innovation and safety.15 These goals are interrelated in com-
plex ways making it difficult to sort out the relationships. One
legal theory that provides the basis for the nation's liability sys-
tem is that injurers will be deterred from producing goods or
services that may be unsafe because of the threat of liability law-
suits. 16 However, if injurers must compensate victims for inju-
ries associated with the use of their products, victims bear little
risk and will themselves have less incentive to avoid accidents. 7
On the other hand, an injurer that has liability insurance theo-
retically has a reduced incentive to deter accidents.' Thus, the
twin goals of accident prevention and risk spreading are often in
unavoidable conflict. Furthermore, the massive costs associated
with litigation make the deterrent effects of liability very expen-
sive, prompting many observers of the nation's liability system to
argue that "first party" accident insurance is a superior method
of compensating victims than "third party" liability insurance."
Despite this argument, third party products liability is a central
feature of the modern civil justice system.2 1 Manufacturers and
sellers of goods traditionally purchased liability insurance to
protect themselves from potential damages that might arise
from the use of their products, and to spread the risks associated
with these goods.2 1 The enormous costs associated with insur-
ance premiums and products liability litigation caused a massive
lobbying campaign by business groups to promote the need for
reform of the civil justice system. Products liability laws are at
the top of reformers' list of actions needed to curb the alleged
abuses.23
According to Huber and Litan, "[w] e know much more about
how the liability system works than about what it achieves."24 In
that regard, it was historically accepted that liability rules pro-
15 See, e.g., LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 3-5 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford
Winston eds., 1988) [hereinafter Litan & Winston].
16 Id. at 3.
17 See, e.g., id.; PROSSER, supra note 14.
18 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 14.
19 See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER, LiaiuTY- THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSE-
QUENCES (1988); Litan & Winston, supra note 15.
20 HUBER, supra note 19, at 8.
21 See, e.g., HUBER, supra note 19; Litan & Winston, supra note 15.
22 See, e.g., Richard B. Schmitt, Senate Acts to Salvage Product Bill By Abandoning
Punitive-Damages Cap, WALL ST. J., May 9, 1995, at A3.
23 Id.
24 LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 13, at 1.
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mote safety.25 The logic is simple: Third party liability laws that
impose costs on manufacturers will raise the price of design
and/or process defects to unacceptable levels. 6 In theory, in
order to avoid these costs, manufacturers will be more vigilant in
product research and development and produce safer prod-
ucts.2 7 This is the standard argument made by the plaintiffs bar
in favor of the products liability system. 28
The long term safety record of general aviation seems to give
credence to this argument, although the efficacy of the tort sys-
tem in promoting safety and innovation is the subject of consid-
erable debate as we discuss elsewhere in this article. 29 Despite
this debate, the scope of liability has expanded substantially over
the past thirty years based upon this logic. 30
D. NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LIABILITY RuLEs
The traditional common law doctrine of liability was the sim-
ple theory of negligence, whereby the injurer is liable only if he
or she failed to' take reasonable care.3' Under the negligence
rule, for one party to be liable to another, the party had to be at
fault.3 2 The theory of negligence was satisfactory until recently
when proof of negligence became unworkable because of the
complexity of products being manufactured and the difficulty of
proving a manufacturer negligent.3 3 As a result, the Supreme
Court of California embraced the rule of strict liability, whereby
the injurer is held liable for damages even if reasonable care was
taken. 4 . Under strict liability standards, the fact that the in-
jurer's behavior was reasonable and free of fault is not a de-
25 Id.
26 Id. at 1-2.
27 See, e.g., PROSSER, supra note 14.
28 See, e.g., The General Aviation Product Liability Standards Act of 1991: Hearings on
S. 645 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 102d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1991) (statement of Robert B. Creamer). For an opposing view, see
HUBER, supra note 19, at 170-71.
2 See infra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
30 Carl Shapiro, Symposium on the Economics of Liability,J. ECON. PERSP., Summer
1991, at 3.
31 GAMA, supra note 3, at 2.
32 Id.
33 Wayne E. Ferrell, Jr., Aircraft Manufacturer's Liability, 17 ANNALS AIR & SPACE
L. 97, 99 (1992).
34 See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1963)
(landmark decision recognizing the imposition of strict liability).
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fense s5 Under strict liability rules, consumers did not have to
prove a manufacturer was negligent.36
According to Ferrell, the accepted definition of strict liability
is stated in Section 402-A, Restatement (Second) of Torts.
The requirements to hold the manufacturer liable are that: the
manufacturer or seller be engaged in the business of selling the
product; the product reaches the consumer without substantial
change in the condition from the time when it was sold; the
product is in a defective condition; (and/or) the product was
unreasonably dangerous to the consumer or to the consumer's
property; and, the defective condition or unreasonably danger-
ous condition was a contributing proximate cause of the injury."
As a theoretical concept, strict liability standards are actually a
special application of the negligence rule in which the reason-
able care standard is set so high that no manufacturer can meet
it.38 Nevertheless, courts across the nation adopted the rule of
strict liability in the 1960s and 1970s, shifting a greater burden
toward manufacturers.3 9
E. PRODUCTS LiABaIxn rN GENERAL AVIATION
During this period, aviation manufacturers became targets of
attack under the new strict liability regime.4° In the aviation
context products liability refers to the question of who bears the
risks associated with accidents. Since aircraft must be designed
and manufactured to very high standards, almost all aviation
products liability cases have involved claims of defective de-
sign.41 Initially, products liability for general aviation was seen
as a problem limited to California, because of its affluence and
geography, and because almost fifteen percent of all general avi-
atiQn aircraft registered in the United States are based in that
state.42 By the mid-1970s, however, manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft began to appreciate the enormous potential
threat that strict liability posed. Annual liability premiums for
35 Ferrell, supra note 33, at 98.
36 Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402-A (1965)).
37 Id.
38 Shapiro, supra note 30, at 6.
39 See, e.g., Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968); Barker v.
Lull Eng'g Co., 573 P.2d 443 (Cal. 1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 514
S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, writ-ref'd n.r.e.).
40 GAMA, supra note 3, at 1-4.
41 Id.
42 Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege, in LIA-
BILITY MAZE, supra note 13, at. 481.
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the defense of an increasing number of liability cases quickly
reached proportions of several million dollars each for the three
largest general aviation aircraft manufacturers. 43 In addition,
suppliers of power plants, avionics, instruments, and parts also
became targets for liability suits.4 4
General aviation aircraft manufacturers made a strategic deci-
sion to vigorously defend virtually every case, despite the circum-
stances of the case or the risks involved. 45 According to one
commentator, general aviation aircraft manufacturers suffer
from "undue pride in their products," which can lead to sorry
results that include large verdicts, bad precedents, a prolifera-
tion of similar claims, increases in insurance rates, and even can-
cellation of insurance. Unwavering commitment to their
products is not surprising from a commercial perspectiye, since
consumer confidence is especially important. No aircraft manu-
facturer can afford to have its name associated with crashes. Ad-
mission of even the smallest defect may lead to lost sales and a
damaged reputation.
In addition to a strong defense, general aviation manufactur-
ers and other groups with a vested interest in general aviation
mounted a well-financed lobbying campaign to reform the na-
43 Gregory P. Wells, Comment, General Aviatin Accident Liability Standards: Why
the Fuss?, 56J. AIR L. & CoM. 895 (1991).
4 GAMA, supra note 3, at 4.
45 A former defense lawyer and current Appellate Court Justice explains why.
It must be noted that defense trial counsel is placed in a dilemma
in many cases involving products liability. It is very difficult, per-
haps impossible, for manufacturers and their regular corporate
counsel to recognize, let alone accept, the state of the law as it ex-
ists in the field of products liability. The relationship between the
engineering and executive personnel of manufacturers and their
attorneys is often inimical to an open, frank discussion of legal re-
sponsibility. Defense trial counsel may become the object of criti-
cism if he forthrightly advises the manufacturer and the
manufacturer's corporate counsel that the case does not appear to
be factually or legally defensible and that the exposure to damages
is very high, and that settlement ... is indicated. He may not be
retained in future cases, even if he is able tW effect a prudent, money-
saving settlement. On the other hand, if he "goes along" (with the
manufacturer and its corporate attorneys), he is more likely to "get
along."
1984 TRiAl. LAWYER'S GUIDE 464 (John J. Kennelly ed.) (emphasis in original);
Blevins v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 728 F.2d 1576 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 468 U.S.
1228 (1984).
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tion's liability laws.46 As part of this campaign they charged, as
Boswell and Coats argue in their article, that "a rash of tort law-
suits based on wildly improbable factual backgrounds plagled
the general aviation industry."47 The proponents of tort reform
use cases involving general aviation accidents to support the
charge that the nation's legal system is out of control. Boswell
and Coats provide several of the most widely cited and outra-
geous cases48 including Cleveland v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,4 9 Datskow
v. Teledyne Continental Motors Aircraft Products,50 Guarnere, Haper
& Cannuli v. Cessna,51 and Hill v. Piper.52
II. CASES SUPPORTING THE INDUSTRY
In addition to those cases cited by Coats and Boswell, several
other cases were also used as evidence to support industry claims
of a judicial system run amok.
A. BrBE v. CssA AJRcRAAT
The industry used other cases such as Bybee v. Cessna5 3 for evi-
dence to support their thesis. In Bybee, Cessna was sued and or-
dered to pay $1 million to a severely injured passenger after a
pilot defaulted on a $750,000 judgment because he failed to in-
form his insurance company of the accident. The pilot, who
had illegally overloaded his aircraft, lost control and crashed
into a building at a California airport. The injured passenger,
the third occupant in a two seat trainer aircraft, was a small boy
illegally occupying the aircraft without a seat or restraint system
who sustained a brain injury when he ejected through the wind-
shield and struck his head on a steel beam inside the building.
B. ST WART V. CESSNA
Another case used by supporters of products liability reform is
Stewart v. Cessna.54 In Stewart,
46 Barbara Carton, Cessna Says It Will Make More Small Airplanes, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 14, 1995, at B1.
47 Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 542.
48 Id. at 542-46.
49 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 291 (1993).
50 826 F. Supp. 677 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
5' Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 545.
52 Id. at 546.
53 GAMA, supra note 3, at 8.
54 Id. at 9.
Unison paid $20,000 to settle its portion of a case where a plane
crashed with a large bird's nest in the engine's air intake. Prior
to takeoff at a New Jersey airport, witnesses said the pilot con-
ducted an excessively long engine run-up. The engine backfired.
Black smoke billowed from its exhaust stack. Still, the pilot
elected to take off. He and his four passengers were seriously
injured. A National Transportation Safety Board investigation
showed a failure to discover the bird's nest during pre-flight
inspection.55
These and other cases provide powerful ammunition to use in
the industry's campaign to reform the American legal system, at
least as it is applied to the general aviation industry. To a public
that is generally very suspicious of trial lawyers, these cases sim-
ply verify the conventional wisdom: that the nation's civil justice
system is-out of control. What many commentators, including
Boswell and Coats, fail to present are cases and information that
demonstrate the lengths that the general aviation industry
would go to cover up safety problems. Careful scrutiny of prod-
ucts liability cases and related materials uncovered a variety of
fraudulent actions on the part of aircraft manufacturers that
portray the nation's liability system and the industry in a very
different light.
III. CASES AND INFORMATION DAMAGING THE
INDUSTRY ACCOUNT
A. CAzL ucc v. PM&'R AIcRCAFT CoR 'oRA TON
For example, in Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,5 6 the court
ruled that Piper forfeited its right to defend itself on the merits
of the case because of its gross and deliberate abuse of the dis-
covery process over a six-year period. Carlucci involved the fatal
crash of a Piper Cheyenne Turbo-prop at Shannon Interna-
tional Airport in Ireland which resulted in the death of four pas-
sengers, all of whom were business executives. In the course of
preparing a wrongful death suit against Piper on behalf of survi-
vors' families, plaintiffs' attorneys amassed considerable damag-
ing evidence that the aircraft's design was flawed. Their
investigation revealed several safety and longitudinal instability
problems-including a propensity to move in a direction oppo-
site from what the control stick indicated. The investigation also
revealed that the serious longitudinal instability problems were
55 Id.
56 102 F.R.D. 472, 486 (S.D. Fla. 1984).
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well known to Piper. The court's scathing forty-five page order
imposed heavy sanctions against Piper for its flagrant abuse of
the discovery process which included willful misconduct such as
concealment and manipulation of evidence, stalling, and inten-
tional alteration, substitution, and destruction of incriminating
evidence.57 After the ruling, the only matter left to be tried was
the question of damages. Carlucci was settled when Piper en-
tered a $10 million consent judgment in the district court in
West Palm Beach, Florida, waving its right to appeal.5
B. BEJE . BEECH
Without a doubt the most infamous case of general aviation
products liability is Beyer v. Beech Aircraft Co.59 Beyer involved one
of Beech's most popular airplanes-the V-Tail Bonanza. A brief
review of the background of the Bonanza is required before
turning to the specifics of Beer. Beech introduced the 35-series
Bonanza with its distinctive "V" or butterfly tail in 1947. This
particular versiop of the Bonanza is the only production plane
in the United States with this unusual design. The Bonanza is
very popular; more than 10,000 V-tailed models have been pro-
duced and sold.60 The airplane has a history of in-flight air-
frame failures as more than 500 persons have died as a result of
crashes in which 250 of these planes have come apart in the
air.61 This record earned the V-Tail Bonanza the ignoble nick-
name among general aviationists of "the split-tail doctor killer,"
because so many doctors own them.6 2
In-flight airframe failures are rare events, responsible for caus-
ing only about one percent of all general aviation accidents; yet
apparently twenty-five percent of V-Tail Bonanza accidents have
involved airframe failures according to Department of Transpor-
tation investigation. 6- An average of seven V-tails come apart
during flight every year.64 No one has survived.65
57 Id.; see also Thomas F. Lambert, Default Sanction Against Pipe Aircraft for Dis-
covey Misconduc, 27 ATLA L. REP. 194-95 (1984).
58 Lambert, supra note 57.
59 Beyer v. Beech Aircraft Co., CV 81-2120 (10thJud. Cir. Ala. Sept. 1985).
60 The account presented here relies heavily on R. Ben Hogan III, The V-Tail
Bonanza: A Turbulence Trap, TIAL, June 1986, at 68-72:
61 See, e.g., Brent Silver, The V-Tail Bonanza-Breaking of a Legend, AVIATION
CONSUMER, Feb. 1, 1980.
62 Hogan, supra note 60, at 68.
63 Id. (citing TRANSPORTATION SYS. CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., TASK FORCE
REPORT, V-TAIL BONANZA INVESTIGATION 79 (Mar. 1985)).
64 Hogan, supra note 60, at 68.
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The official position of Beech Aircraft has been that there is
nothing wrong with the design of the Bonanza, rather, the fault
is with pilots who allow the aircraft to get into overspeed condi-
tions that causes structural breakdown.66 However, Beech also
produces a Bonanza model that is identical in every way, except,
for the V-tail .6 According to a study by the National Transpor-
tation Safety Board (NTSB) only three Bonanza's with conven-
tional tails have experienced in-flight faifures in its history-a
rate less than one-twentieth as high as the V-tail's." With this
background, we can now turn to Beyer.
On May 23, 1979, Joseph Beyer was asked to transport a V-Tail
Bonanza from his base in' Florida to its new owner in Mississippi.
The aircraft was produced in 1956 but it had less than 3,000
hours of airframe time, making it a "young" aircraft by Bonanza
standards. 69 Records show that while en route, Beyer, a profes-
sional instrument-rated pilot, stopped in Tallahassee to refuel
and check weather conditions to his destination, Vicksburg.
Beyer filed an Instrument Flight Rules (IFR) plan that would
have taken him directly from Tallahassee to Mobile where he
was to turn onto another IFR airway to Vicksburg. Computer
records of the aircraft's path reveal that Beyer flew a straight
line to Mobile where he made an unexpected turn and disap-
peared from radar. Beyer was unusual in that there were eyewit-
nesses on the ground who say that they saw the plane
descending from 3,000 feet relatively level but "floundering."
They reported that the wings and tail suddenly broke off from
the fuselage in what appeared to be an explosion; the fuselage
subsequently crashed onto a blacktop parking lot, killing Beyer.
Beyer's descendants filed suit against Beech in the circuit
court of Jefferson County, Birmingham, Alabama, contending
that (1) defective tail design led to the failure of the aircraft and
(2) Beech was negligent for failing to warn pilots of the higher




67 Id. at 71.
68 Hogan, supra note 60, at 68 (citing NATIONAL TRA.NSP. SAFEY BD., BUREAU OF
TECHNOLOGY, REPORT No. NTSB-AAS-79-1 (May 31, 1979)).
64 Hogan, supra note 60, at 68.
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1. V-Tail Design History
In the early 1950s, Beech attempted to reduce the known tail-
wagging properties of the Bonanza by increasing the size of the
stabilizers.7° The aircraft makers added six inches of sheet metal
to the leading edge of each stabilizer (the V-tail surfaces). 7' But
the spars that hold the tail to the fuselage were not moved for-
ward at the time the leading edge was increased. 2 In the modi-
fied tail, present in the Beyer Bonanza and all other post-1951
models, the front spar remained in the middle of the tail. 73 In
essence, the front fifteen inches of the tail are not connected to
the airplane.7 4 According to expert testimony, it is the V-tail de-
sign and flawed modifications that can result in complete in-
flight breakup of the aircraft.75
Thus, evidence of the defect was known to Beech officials as
early as the mid-1950s. The aircraft, however, was enormously
popular and in 1956 Beech introduced the Model 35C Bonanza,
which featured increased horsepower and engine size to im-
prove performance.76 In the fall of 1957 a group of concerned
Bonanza owners requested that engineers design an add-on
structural modification to cure the defect.77 The engineers
completed their work and sent the appropriate materials to FAA
and NTSB officials.78 The FAA recommended that Beech inves-
tigate the efficacy of the proposed structural modification to the
tail.79 The company, however, declined to make any structural
changes.80 Despite clear evidence of the defect, no action was
taken by Beech to address the tail problem.
The number of crashes involving Bonanzas with apparent
structural problems began to mount.81 The Civil Aeronautics
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Agency (CAA), predecessor to the FAA, was responsibile for in-
vestigating these accidents. Troubling reports began to surface
that provided seemingly powerful evidence that the Bonanza
was seriously flawed. 2 For example, CAA investigator Robert F.
Wedberg concluded in a report to his supervisor that "in view of
the accident record of the Bonanza involving tail failures, it is
recommended that the tail be redesigned by moving the front
spar of the stabilizer forward." 3 Another investigator submitted
the following report:
Once again there had been a fatal accident in the region involv-
ing a Beech Bonanza tail failure and the question again arises
regarding the strength of the tail .... As in previous cases which
we have investigated, the sequence of failures started with the tail
which failed torsionally downward .... The torsional failure is
due, as you know, to the fact that the stabilizer front spar is lo-
cated too far aft at 50% of the stabilizer chord. We note in your
memorandum ... that the effect of the torsional deflection on
the stabilizer airload distribution (CAR3.171b) was not taken into
account during the static tests .... [I]t is felt that [further]
test[s] should be made .... We realize that there will be consid-
erable opposition from Beech to retesting the tail as their per-
sonnel have been adamant during accident investigations in
maintaining that the tail does not fail first. However, we feel that
there are good and sufficient reasons for checking the tail.8"
This strong language provides compelling evidence of concerns
voiced by safety investigators regarding the Beech Bonanza tail.
It is both astonishing and disturbing that company executives
did not see fit to address the investigators'. recommendations.
These reports raise serious questions over the efficacy of safety
regulations and the relationship between regulators and the in-
dustry. By 1958 Beech management completed an internal
study entitled "Comparison of the Model 35 V-tails vs. Model 95
Conventional Tail."85 The report indicated that:
Much of the advertising on the Model 35 has been directed to-
ward the advantages of the V-tail; its contribution to the in-
82 Id.
85 Hogan, supra note 60, at 70 (quoting Memorandum from Robert F.
Wedberg, Design Evaluation Engineer, to the Chief, Airframe and Equipment
Branch CAA (May 1, 1956) (discussing partial failure of left stabilizer on V-tail of
Beech Bonanza Model C35 Tail)).
84 Id. (quoting Memorandum from N.N. Shapter, Chief, Airframe and Equip-
ment Branch, to Region 3 Administrator, CAA (May 23, 1958) (refering to Beech
Bonanza Model C35 Tail)).
85 Id. at 71.
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creased useful load of the airplane due to its lighter weight; and
higher performance available due to its lower drag. Another
item not advertised but much discussed within the plant has
been its lower manufacturing cost which thereby increases our
profit potential .... If the K-35 (Serial 5796 and after) were to
be built with a Model 95 tail surfaces (conventional tail) instead
of the Model 35 tail surfaces, the airplane would be affected as
follows: (A) Beech cost would be increased about $1,047 per air-
plane per production cost alone based on 300th Model 95 tail
versus unit time on present Model 35 tail. These figures do not
include amortization of any tooling or development costs for li-
censing the new airplane.'
Management concluded that the V-Tail Bonanza had a
proven market ap peal and the unusual design saved the com-
pany more than ,000 per plane in production costs. 7 Despite
a steady rise in fatal accidents and growing concern among Bo-
nanza owners and associated groups, Beech continued to deny
any defect with the V-tail design."" The aircraft maker mounted
vigorous defenses and won all suits-until Beyer. 9
2. The Trial
Beyer was filed in the State of Alabama Circuit Court in Bir-
mingham. Beech neither seek to move to federal court nor con-
tested venue in Jefferson County. Beech hired a former
president of the Alabama Bar Association as its chief counsel. As
expected, Beech denied that any defect in the V-tail caused the
fatal accident and did not offer a settlement. Instead, the de-
fense utilized its proven defense theory: the pilot error scenario.
Beech hired professional experts who speculated that Beyer
probably became spatially disoriented at about 8,000 feet and
allowed the plane to go into a high-speed dive condition that
stressed the aircraft beyond its designed limits. It was a theory
that had been successful in the past.90 But, in Beyer, several eye-
witnesses testified that they had watched as the plane dis-
integrated, beginning at the tail. 91
86 Id. (quoting K.W. Rix, Beech Aircraft Corporation Memorandum, Report
2452 (1958)).
87 Id.
88 Stearman, supra note 75.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' Hogan, supra note 60, at 71.
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At the end of a three-week trial and a two-day jury delibera-
tion, the jury was deadlocked 9-3 in favor of the plaintiffs.92 A
mistrial was declared. 3 In the second trial Beech hired addi-
tional experts to testify. Nevertheless, after a two-week trial and
a two-hour deliberation the jury came back with a determination
that the defective design of the V-tail was the cause of Beyer's
death, resulting in a landmark award for the Beyer estate.94 The
floodgates were opened.
Only after Beyer and another important Bonanza crash involv-
ing a well-known American Bonanza Society member 95 did
Beech take action to remedy the structural design problems as-
sociated with the V-tail. It took more than twenty-five years of
denials, cover-ups, and stonewalling before Beech was willing to
address a problem it had been well aware of since the mid-
1950s. This is well beyond the eighteen-year repose period con-
tained in GARA. Interestingly, the products liability system
placed significant economic pressure on American aircraft man-
ufacturers. The industry's response is also instructive: it at-
tacked the trial lawyers and mounted a vigorous campaign to
reform an out-of-control civil justice system.
C. MEASURING THE FNANCIAL IMPACT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A steady escalation of loss and defense costs continued into
the 1980s. As insurers incurred mounting losses, they in-
creased liability premiums.9 As a result, aircraft manufacturers
were forced to divert a greater proportion of capital and other
corporate resources to insurance premiums and costs of defend-
ing liability lawsuits.9 9 The price of new airplanes reached the
point that they were beyond the means of the average purchaser
of light piston aircraft.100 A 1987 study conducted by Beech at
the request of the House Aviation Subcommittee concluded that
the average cost to the manufacturer (the total of losses and de-
fense expenses) for each accident was $530,000, while the aver-
age amount claimed per occurrence was approximately $10
92 Beyer v. Beech Aircraft Co., CV 81-2120 (1OthJud. Cir. Ala. Sept. 1985).
93 Id.
94 Hogan, supra note 60, at 71.
95 Stearman, supra note 75.
96 Id.
0.1 Martin, supra note 42, at 483.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 GAMA, supra note 3, at 4.
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million.'' By 1987, "the three [largest general aviation] manu-
facturers calculated that their annual costs for product liability
ranged from $70,000 to $100,000 per unit built and shipped
during the year."' 02 Of course, these studies provided just the
type of evidence that aircraft manufacturers wanted to present
as part of their broad calls for reform of the liability system.
It is important to consider precisely how these costs are calcu-
lated. Assume that a manufacturer has a fleet of 100,000 aircraft
in active service in a given year. Furthermore, assume that the
same manufacturer produces only 200 units during the year.
Finally, assume that its liability insurance premiums total $20
million per year. If the manufacturer divides its insurance cost
($20M) by the number of units produced and sold in a given
year (200), the resulting insurance cost is $100,000 per each
unit of production. This is precisely how Cessna, Piper, and
Beech arrive at such cost figures. It is important to recognize
that each one of the 100,000 outstanding aircraft represents a
potential liability suit. Any accounting system or costing scheme
that allocates these costs to current production dramatically
(and artificially) increases the cost, and perhaps the selling
price, of airplanes at a time when they are already facing diffi-
cult market conditions. Such cost figures, however, can be very
effective as evidence in a campaign to demonstrate that the lia-
bility system is out of control. This is part of the industry's long
effort to significantly limit its products liability exposure.
The point of this extensive review of general aviation products
liability law is not to promote one side or the other of the debate
over the efficacy of the civil justice system. Rather, it is to cau-
tion against merely accepting the general aviation industry's
case without a critical examination, as Boswell and Coats appear
to have done. We do not deny that products liability has caused
serious problems for American aircraft manufacturers. The es-
sence of public policy behind the products liability law is the
concept that those who manufacture products and place them
in the stream of commerce ought to bear the burden of defec-
tive units and compensate those who are injured by defective
units.1 0 3 In addition, under Civil Aeronautics Regulations, once
products have been placed into commerce, aircraft manufactur-
ers have a duty to warn consumers of any unsafe part or charac-
10, Martin, supra note 42, at 485.
102 Id. at 484.
103 PROSSER, supra note 14, at 641.
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teristic and to produce a safer design. 10 4 In other words,
according to Hogan, if a dangerous defect comes to the atten-
tion of a manufacturer after a plane is sold, the manufacturer
has a duty to either remedy the defect, or, if a remedy is not
feasible, to give users reasonable warnings and instructions
about how to minimize the danger. 0 5 Unfortunately, while we
believe that the majority of American light aircraft are safe and
reliable planes, considerable evidence exists to suggest that sev-
eral other models manufactured by the Big Three are afflicted
with design defects-including the Cessna 210, Cessna 411, and
Piper Cherokee.'0 6 Moreover, there is ample evidence to sug-
gest that the industry is guilty of refusing to accept and admit
design and/or manufacturing defects as well as going so far as
to cover up their knowledge of the defects.'0 7
We are equally convinced that there is ample evidence to sup-
port the industry's contention that it is the victim of far too
many frivolous and enormously expensive lawsuits. Clearly, the
political winds have shifted recently toward this view as demon-
strated by the passage of GARA. There is no question that a fed-
eral system that establishes a single law providing a uniform
general aviation products liability law will add an element of pre-
dictability into the milieu. Our purpose here has been to place
the '"liability crisis" thesis under more critical scrutiny. The re-
mainder of this Paper examines the liability thesis in more detail
to assess the degree to which the liability crisis affected the gen-
eral aviation industry. Before moving to our analysis we must
address the question of the impact that the liability system has
had on safety and innovation.
D. SAFETY AND INNOVATION
The primary argument in favor of the liability system is that it
promotes safety.' °8 Not surprisingly, the link between liability
and safety is complex. The general aviation industry uses its ex-
cellent safety record as its primary evidence to support its con-
tention that it has been unfairly targeted.0 9 It cites federal
104 Hogan, supra note 60, at 70.
105 Id. at 71.
106 Hearings on S. 640 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transpor-
tation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1989) (statement by Mr. Charles T. Hvass, Jr.,
partner, Hvass, Weisman, & King) [hereinafter Hvass].
107 Stearman, supra note 74.
108 LIABILITY MAZE, supra note 13, at 1.
109 GAMA, supra note 3, at 1.
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reports which conclude that ninety-three percent of aircraft ac-
cidents are caused by pilot error, poor maintenance, or bad
weather.110 Aircraft manufacturers also contend that a number
of products have been developed to increase air safety but that
their makers have been reluctant to introduce such improve-
ments as a direct result of fears of exposure to liability suits."'
Boswell and Coats, as well as many other industry observers, ap-
parently without qualification, accept the argument that, per-
versely, strict products liability has damaged safety.' 1 2
In a widely publicized study published by the Brookings Insti-
tution, researcher Robert Martin uses a simple regression analy-
sis of fatal accident rates in two twenty-year time' periods to
prove that the "product liability crisis" has stifled research and
development efforts to promote safety.1 13 Martin shows that the
decline in fatal accidents from 1950 to 1969 was significantly bet-
ter than in the twenty-year period from 1970 to 1989 "after the
intervention of strict liability and the litigation it[ ] spawned." 4
The Brookings study concludes that "[s] trict liability, as applied
to general aviation, has proved a dismal failure, both as a repara-
tions system and as a devise to encourage innovation, product
improvement, and aviation safety." 115
This is not convincing. One glaring deficiency that Martin
(and others) fails to incorporate into the analysis is the matur-
ing of the aviation industry. In the 1950s, the industry was in its
infancy and developments in safety improvement occurred rap-
idly. By the mid-1970s the general aviation industry was in the
mature stage and about to enter a stage of decline. Of course, it
is much more difficult to continuously improve safety rates as
the base from which the rates are calculated is reduced. The
marginal costs of achieving the next increment of safety tends to
increase, especially for mature products. In these cases, product
liability may only work to maintain levels of safety. While the
general aviation industry's safety record does not show dramatic
improvement during the products liability crisis, there is evi-
dence that its safety record was maintained.
In any event, others suggest that the picture is more complex.
For instance, a study conducted by Andrew Craig designed to
110 Id.
III Id.
112 Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 551-53.
Is Martin, supra note 42, at 494.
114 Id. at 493.
115 Id. at 497.
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determine the extent to which recent liability trends have af-
fected safety in the aircraft sector found that the number of law-
suits and the number of accidents per year stayed nearly
constant.1 6 Craig examined the industry's fatality record dur-
ing the period 1962-86 and concluded that the rate remained
unchanged. 17 Although it is beyond the scope of this article to
elaborate, Craig developed a "general aviation system" model
that illustrates the complexity and interaction between the "reg-
ulation block" and the "liability block," each with its own inter-
nal elements.1 18 Craig concludes that the task of measuring the
relationship between products liability and safety is made diffi-
cult by the complexity of the relationships between the various
public and private actors involved in general aviation. 9
In 1993 the FAA reported that "general aviation has become
safer in the last two decades, and especially in the last dec-
ade." ' 2 0 The FAA's data revealed that total general aviation acci-
dents declined from 3,500 in 1981 to only 2,022 in 1993, a 42%
improvement.121 In addition, a 1995 report by the AOPA Safety
Foundation says that NTSB statistics indicate that the number of
general aviation accidents in 1994 was the lowest since before
World War 11.122 As illustrated in Figure 1, the long run trend
towards greater safety is measured by total accidents and by acci-
dents per 100,000 hours flown. The debate whether products
liability laws promotes safety or stifles innovation is indetermi-
nant. The rhetoric surrounding this issue seems to support
Mile's Law which states, "where you stand depends upon where
you sit.' 23
Despite these unanswered questions, the general aviation in-
dustry has been very successful at framing the issue as an indus-
trial and competitive disaster of monumental proportions
caused primarily by a failed legal doctrine and a liability system
that benefited the trial lawyers at the expense of the public in-
116 Andrew Craig, Product Liability and Safety in General Aviation, in LIABILrrY
MAZE, supra note 13, at 457.
117 Id. at 457-58.
118 Id. at 458.
119 Id. at 475-76.
120 FAA, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., GENERAL AVIATION AcriON PLAN 11 (1994).
121 Id.
122 GA Accidents Now at Lowest Level Since Before WWI, AOPA PILOT, Mar. 1995,
at 8.
123 GEORGE BERKLEY &JOHN ROUSE, THE CRAFT OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 109
(6th ed. 1994).
184
terest.1 4 Its ability to influence public opinion as well as the
behavior of politicians was demonstrated by passage of the Gen-
eral Aviation Revitalization Act. The law was hailed by general
aviation enthusiasts, who said that it would stimulate a renais-
sance in the nation's civil aviation.12
5
IV. REASSESSING THE PAST
A. HEALTH AND PERFORMANCE OF THE GENERAL AVIATION
INDUSTRY PRIOR TO 1979
Boswell and Coats suggest that "the American general aviation
industry served as a model to the world" in the late 1970s.126
Without citing relevant production figures they offer the con-
ventional story about the robust health of the industry prior to
the "tort onslaught."12 7 This version of general aviation history
is more romantic than realistic. The industry did indeed reach
fantastic levels of production in the late 1970s that, to.some ob-
servers, signalled the dawning of a new age where owning and
operating a general aviation aircraft would come within the
reach of the average American.12 8 Unfortunately, these observa-
tions were premature. The industry began a precipitous decline
in the early 1980s and continues in the doldrums today.'2
It is seemingly taken as an article of faith by Boswell and Coats
and a number of other commentators that the industry was with-
out problems.1 30 These observers see the surge in production as
the product of increased demand for aircraft by a public that
wanted desperately to fly.1 3' As Boswell and Coats suggest: "The
dream of flight was a realizable goal for most Americans thanks
to the general aviation industry. " 13 2
This view of the industry is not supported by the evidence
from the bigger picture of the industry or the reasons for the
surge in production that peaked in 1978. A more critical look at
the industry's production levels suggests that the general avia-
124 See e.g., Liability Reform Puts Limits on Lawsuits, Will Boost General Aviation
Industry and Create Jobs, PR NEWSWIRE, Aug. 17, 1994, at 1.
125 GENERAL AVIATION MFRs. ASS'N, ANNUAL INDUSTRY REVIEW 3 (1994).
126 Boswell & Coats, supra note 1, at 539.
127 Id. at 539-42. The authors provide one production figure: "In 1978, Ameri-
can manufacturers produced 14,389 single-engine aircraft.. . ." Id. at 542.
128 Id. at 540.
19 Id. at 535.
130 Id. at 539.
13, Id. at 540.
132 Id. (emphasis added).
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tion industry is not very different than other industries at or
near the end of the product cycle where further innovation is
stifled for one reason or another.1 33 Industries whose primary
products are near the end of the cycle tend to operate in an
increasingly cyclical pattern of booms and busts." 4 In the gen-
eral aviation industry, for example, manufacturers experienced
a surge in production in the 1960s that rivals the surge in the
1970s (See Figure 2).5 It is not surprising that industry sup-
porters rarely point this out in discussions about the impact of
products liability lawsuits. After peaking at nearly 16,000 units
in 1966, production fell to under 8,000 in 1970.1 6 It is impor-
tant to note that the industry experienced booms and busts as a
function of its normal operations in a politically and economi-
cally complex environment. It is equally important to recognize
that just as no single cause can explain the surge and decline in
the 1960s, no single cause, such as products liability lawsuits, can
explain the decline in the 1980s. To understand what hap-
pened to the American general aviation industry one must ex-
amine several other factors that affected the health of the
industry during the upswing in the 1970s and the subsequent
decline in the 1980s and beyond.
B. THE SURGE rN GENERAL AVIATION IN THE 1970s
Proponents of the products liability crisis argument tend to
focus solely on the industry's decline in the 1980s. One reason
for this focus is that it is very persuasive to show a chart of de-
clining production starting in 1979 when the crisis is generally
said to have started. The single-cause products liability argu-
ment is bolstered by such use of the data because it seemingly
supports the claim that all was well until the greedy trial lawyers
began to view general aviation manufacturers as an attractive
deep pocket. As we describe elsewhere in this Paper,13 7 we do
not dispute the fact that many of the lawsuits filed against the
general aviation industry were frivolous and damaging. It is crit-
ical, however, not to let this bias an analysis of the decline of the
industry. Popular accounts of greedy trial lawyers and anecdotal
133 See, e.g., RAYMOND VERNON, SOVEREIGNTY AT BAY: THE MULTINATIONAL
SPREAD OF U.S. ENTERPRISES 65-77 (1971).
154 Id.
135 GENERAL AVIATION MFRS. ASS'N, GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL HANDBOOK
(1994).
136 Id.
137 See supra notes 18-20 and acommpanying text.
186








(sun) UOflOnpod UCAMIAW IUJOUSOD
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
evidence of outrageous settlements are useful lobbying tools,
but not the basis for good analysis.
The decline cannot be understood without a reasonable un-
derstanding of the preceding surge in production. Achieving a
better understanding of the boom in the 1970s allows for more
complete analysis of the causes of the subsequent decline. Most
accounts of the general aviation industry's decline omit discus-
sion of the sustainability, or lack thereof, of the fantastic produc-
tion volumes in 1977 and 1978.138 If these production figures
overestimated the actual demand for general aviation aircraft,
then the surge in production itself likely played some role in the
downward pressure in the early 1980s. There is good evidence
to suggest that for a number of reasons, manufacturers and
others involved in the sale of aircraft misjudged the market and
set the industry up for a bust.
Two factors, inflation and changes in GI Bill flight training
benefits, seem to support the argument that the surge in pro-
duction created an unsustainable production volume that even-
tually depressed the demand for the production of new aircraft
in the 1980s. First, brokers and retailers believed the relatively
high inflation rates of the late 1970s afforded them speculative
opportunities for the resale of new aircraft139 Thus, speculation
brought on by inflation artificially increased demand. Second,
the perceived increases in demand were exacerbated by the pos-
sibility that GI Bill flight training benefits, which allowed veter-
ans to obtain subsidized flight training, were going to be
discontinued. 14° This prospect had the effect of creating a "run"
on flight training programs, whose managers ordered additional
aircraft to meet the anticipated increase. Information concern-
ing the expected surge in demand comes from industry repre-
sentatives and data from the Federal Aviation Administration.
Figure 3 shows how student pilot starts surged in the late 1970s.
The combination of the manufacturers' optimism about the
future of air travel and the demand brought on by speculation
and the flight training boom flooded the market at perhaps the
worst possible time in terms of macroeconomic conditions. The
subsequent decline in the market for single-engine aircraft was
138 See, e.g., GAMA supra note 3 (discussing decline in production as a result of
liability suits, but making no mention of market saturation as a mitigating factor).
139 Information regarding speculation during this period comes from inter-
views with industry representatives.
140 Bill Worthington, New GI Bill M Spark Flight Training Business, AIRPORT
SERVICES, July-Aug. 1990, at 39.
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fostered in part by the industry's apparent success in the 1970s.
Before his organization got caught up in the manufacturers'
products liability rhetoric, Mr. John Baker, President of the Air-
craft Owners & Pilots Association, admitted as much in a letter
dated September 29, 1988:
[P] roduct liability judgments are not the cause of the new air-
cratt shortage in which we find ourselves. It is merely a symptom.
The cause of the problem was clearly some unbelievable bad
business decisions by the manufacturers 15 to 20 years ago, which
is compounded by some lousy products. If the industry was an-
nually producing the 20-25,000 quality products at an affordable
price that the marketplace would absorb, then the per-unit prod-
uct liability insurance costs would not be significantly greater
than they mere in the mid-70s. 4'
The next section outlines the various economic forces that
turned against the general aviation industry at a time when its
own overbuilding left it commercially vulnerable.
V. THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN GENERAL AVIATION:
ALTERNATIVE FACTORS
Increased production at the end of the 1970s was not met by a
commensurate surge in actual demand. This is not to say that
the manufacturers misinterpreted the desire of the American
public to learn to fly and possibly own general aviation aircraft.
All indications are that the public remained enamored with fly-
ing.142 Unfortunately for the manufacturers, brokers, and retail-
ers the large surpluses of new aircraft coincided with
deteriorating general economic conditions. 143 Figure 4 shows
how poor economic conditions followed on the heels of the
surge in production. Fuel prices skyrocketed in 1979, the prime
lending rate reached a high of nineteen percent in 1981, and
the nation's economy experienced negative growth in 1982. All
three of these occurrences and a number of related economic
factors made buying and operating general aviation aircraft in-
creasingly beyond the reach of even wealthier consumers.
14, Letter from John Baker, President of the Aircraft Owners & Pilots Associa-
tion to John Howie (Sept. 29, 1988) (on file with author).
142 See, e.g., DAVID RUBIN & REGINA VANDUZEE, THE DEMAND FOR SINGLE ENGINE
PIsTON AIRCRAFT (1987).
143 ECONOMIC INDICATORS HANDBOOK' TIME SERIES, CONVERSIONS, DOCUMENTA-
TION (ArsenJ. Darnay ed., 1992).
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A. INTEREST RATES AND OTHER IMPORTANT FACTORS
The industry could not have foreseen the dramatic increase in
fuel prices or the other traumatic economic conditions that
plagued the nation in the early 1980s, but its actions in the late
1970s set the stage for a bigger fall. The surge in production left
a considerable surplus of aircraft. Increased costs of operation
and generally bad economic conditions made ownership less at-
tr-active. 1 "1 Interest rates had a double barrel effect on the indus-
try. High interest rates reduced the number of potential aircraft
purchasers. Perhaps more importantly, the aircraft the manu-
facturers managed to sell during the period were frequently sold
with the aid of "creative financing packages" that offered con-
sumers deeply discounted loan rates and low down payments.
Of course, the costs of these subsidized rates were reflected in
the manufacturers' profit and loss statements.1 45
The lesson here is that even without a products liability crisis
the general aviation industry would have likely suffered through
a dramatic downturn. Its own commercial strategy of flooding
the market in the late 1970s combined with the disastrous gen-
eral economic conditions of the early 1980s to wreak havoc on
the industry. This situation was exacerbated by products liability
lawsuits at the very time when aircraft manufacturers were
forced to spread the cost of defending themselves across a dwin-
dling number of new aircraft. The next section assesses the in-
teraction of products liability suits and the general commercial
condition of the industry described above.
B. REASSESSING THE EFFECT OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY CLAIMS -ON
THE GENERAL AVIATION INDUSTRY
It is difficult to isolate the impact of products liability lawsuits
on the general aviation industry. Systematic attempts at study-
ing the industry through statistical analysis have met with lim-
ited success because of the lack of good data and the difficulty
of conceptualizing the cause and effect relationship of the vari-
ous factors that play some role in shaping the industry.146 In the
absence of rigorous analysis of the issue, the public debate has
been guided by two opposing groups, both of whom are biased
because of their close connections with the industry and the
144 FAA, AVIATION FORECASTS FISCAL YEARS 1991-2002 (1991).
145 Information concerning financing comes from interviews with industry
representatives.
146 See, e.g., RUBIN & V~ADuzEE, supra note 142.
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legal profession. The high political and economic stakes in the
debate over the issue of tort reform in general aviation created a
situation in which industry supporters overstated the health of
the industry and its safety record. 4 7 On the opposing side the
trial lawyers and consumer advocates down played the damage
that frivolous lawsuits have on industry and stressed the poten-
tial danger of owning and operating single-engine aircraft man-
ufactured in an environment where manufacturers were not
threatened by the prospect of products liability claims against
them for defective aircraft.148
Our conclusion is that products liability claims against the
general aviation manufacturers were not the sole or even the
most important cause of the decline of the industry. These
claims combined with existing problems within the industry and
generally bad economic conditions to make the decline more
pronounced and perhaps longer than it might have been other-
wise. Having recognized this, we turn our attention to the re-
form of products liability statutes in general aviation, specifically
the General Aviation Revitalization Act (GARA) and its potential
impact.
VI. THE FUTURE OF GENERAL AVIATION
A. UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF TORT REFORM ON
GENERAL AVIATION
Just as it is impossible to fully understand the reasons for the
decline of the American general aviation industry in the 1980s
without looking at the reasons for the surge in production in
the 1970s, it is unreasonable to expect the changes in the indus-
try in the wake of the passage of the GARA to tell us much about
the impact of tort reform unless we Understand the other
changes in the industry prior to and after the passage of the
statute of repose. Boswell and Coats suggest that general avia-
tion offers an "ideal laboratory for tort reform."" 9 Such claims
conjure up images of experiments and systematic analysis based
on scientific principles. The laboratory analogy is problematic
and potentially dangerous. It is problematic because even basic
elements of careful research design are not followed by those
who suggest that the GARA is a good test of the efficacy of tort
147 See, e.g., Senatorts, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1994, at A12.
148 See, e.g., Creamer, supra note 28.
149 Boswell & Coats, supra note 1.
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reform efforts. It is dangerous because it suggests that this case
should serve as an example or model for future reform efforts.
The basic research question in the case of tort reform in gen-
eral aviation is whether the industry will rebound after receiving
some measure of relief from products liability claims. The stat-
ute of repose implemented in the GARA effectively limits the
manufacturer's liability exposure by reducing the responsibility
of the manufacturer from the life of the aircraft to eighteen
years from the time of manufacture. 50 The Act will dramatically
reduce exposure since aircraft produced during the last boom
of the 1970s will soon slip beyond the eighteen year period. An
optimistic view of the likely impact of the GARA is that the in-
dustry will rebound once this unfair burden is lifted. As industry
supporters imply, the manufacturers can get back in the busi-
ness of making planes and out of the business of defending
themselves against outrageous suits.
This is a superficial and short-sighted view of the research
problem. It effectively ignores both positive and negative
changes that have occurred over the past decade. If these
changes are not included in the analysis, the lessons drawn from
tort reform in general aviation are likely to be at best incom-
plete and at worse dangerously misleading. The next section
outlines a number of changes in the industry that must be con-
sidered in any analysis of the ramifications of tort reform in gen-
eral aviation.
B. COMMERCIAL AND POLITICAL CHANGES AFFECTING
GENERAL AVIATION
As one might expect, the traditional general aviation manu-
facturers sought relief from the cost of products liability claims
against them. 51 The legal strategies have been discussed else-
where in this Paper.1 52 The political and commercial strategies
are equally important. The manufacturers and their supporters
began working in the early 1980s to achieve some legislative re-
form for tort laws as they applied to general aviation.15 3 Stories
of stonewalling by the HouseJudiciary Committee in an effort to
keep the reform effort from reaching a public vote in the House
150 See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (Supp. V 1993).
151 For a historical summary of the GAMA effort, see Erwin Saba, WICHITA Bus.
J., Aug. 26, 1994, at A3.
152 See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
153 Saba, supra note 151, at A3.
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of Representatives are well known and will not be recounted
here. 154 It is important to note, however, that the effort to re-
form tort laws was an arduous process that involved a series of
compromises during the almost fifteen years that it took to get a
bill to a vote in Congress. 55 Even though the bill eventually
passed, it is important to note that it took many years, a good
deal of political horse trading, 56 and an unusual legislative ma-
neuver known as the dispatch petition 15 7 before the industry re-
ceived relief 1 58
A number of important changes occurred in American gen-
eral aviation beyond those discussed above. These changes were
in part a function of the products liability crisis, but also a func-
tion of changes in the technologies associated with developing
and producing single-engine aircraft. As traditional manufac-
turers adjusted to the burden of tort claims against them, new
firms entered the market.1 59 The transformation of the market
is likely to have a lasting impact.
C. CHANGES IN MARKET STRUCTURE
Industry supporters frequently point to declining production
of single-engine aircraft as their primary indicator of the dam-
age of the product liability crisis.1' When data on the decline
are taken together with data on company earnings for members
of the General Aviation Manufacturers Association (GAMA) an
interesting picture about the health and structure of America's
general aviation industry emerges. 61 While production of sin-
gle-engine aircraft plummeted, total billings increased for mem-
154 See, e.g., Daniel R. Levine, How the Trial Lawyers Finally Met Defeat, READER'S
DIG., Nov. 1994, at 127; David Field, Small-Plane Induetty Finally Wins One as a New
Law Clips Attorney's Wings, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1994, at B9. Levine uses general
aviation as an example to show how trial lawyers are killing the American econ-
omy with the aid of fellow lawyers in Congress.
155 Levine, supra note 154, at 127.
156 The legislation only received support from labor interests after they were
assured the legislation would not limit the right of employees to sue their employ-
ers. See, e.g., WICHITA Bus. J., supra note 151.
157 Levine, supra note 154.
158 Id.
159 GENERAL AVIATION MFRS. ASs'N, GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL HANDBOOK
(1994) [hereinafter GAMA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK].
160 See, e.g., Howard Banks, Cleared for Takeoff. Congress Took Big Step Toward Tort
Reform Last Month, and Cessna Aircraft Co. Looks Like a Big Winner, FORBES, Sept. 12,
1994, at 115-16.
161 GAMA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 159.
1995] 195
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW A)ND COMMERCE
ber firms (See Figure 5).162 The explanation for this seemingly
contradictory finding is worth exploring because it sheds consid-
erable light on one of the major changes in the general aviation
industry.
As noted earlier, the bulk of products liability lawsuits against
the manufacturers involved single-engine aircraft.1 63 These light
aircraft tend to be owned and operated by private individuals
who use them for business and/or recreational flying.164 In con-
trast to the executive or business segment of the industry that
uses professional pilots, the light aircraft segment involves pri-
vate individuals whose skills as pilots are sometimes suspect.1 65
Given that the majority of crashes in general aviation are attribu-
table to pilot error as the primary cause, it is not surprising that
most of the crashes, hence most of the lawsuits, come from the
single-engine category.1 66 As it turns out, the light aircraft cate-
gory also offers the slimmest profit margin for the manufactur-
ers when compared to the business and executive segment.1 67
The manufacturers quickly recognized the two-fold problems of
being in the single-engine aircraft business and wisely chose to
move the bulk of their development and production efforts into
the up-scale business aircraft market, which includes multi-en-
gine, turbo-prop, and small jet aircraft. 168 The move limited
their future exposure to the kinds of lawsuits they most fre-
quently defended themselves against and placed them in a mar-
ket where profit margins were more attractive.1 69
D. THE EMERGING KITPLANE MARKET
The exit from the single-engine segment by the traditional
manufacturers created a void in the market. The demand for
such aircraft persisted, but many consumers refused to pay the
premium prices for the few aircraft being produced by the tradi-
162 Id.
163 See, e.g., H.W. LEWIS, TECHNOLOGICAL RISK (1990). In a broader discussion
of the risk associated with the operation of small aircraft, Lewis notes that the
National Transportation Safety Board lists the pilot as the probable cause of fatal




167 Information concerning profit margins comes from discussions with indus-
try representatives and interpretation of GAMA published data.
168 GAMA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 159.
169 Information on profits and firm strategies comes from interviews with in-
dustry representatives and published firm data.
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tional manufacturers, turning their attention instead to an
emerging and increasingly important segment of the market-
the kitplane.170 Kitplanes offer the consumer a cost-effective al-
ternative to traditionally manufactured planes.171 In many cases
kitplanes offer better performance, more flexibility in terms of
avionics, and other options not offered by traditional single-en-
gine aircraft.1 72
The retreat by traditional manufacturers to the higher end of
the market and the emergence of new competition in the form
of kitplanes must be included in any assessment of the effects of
tort reform on general aviation. The GARA was passed to pro-
vide relief to traditional manufacturers who have considerable
exposure because of their large fleets of existing aircraft.1 73
Those manufacturers are no longer the major players in the sin-
gle-engine market.1 74 It is not clear how strong a commitment
the big three manufacturers are willing to make to this segment
of the market in the face of what appears to be serious competi-
tion from experimental and kitplane manufacturers.
Supporters of the industry and those who fought hard for the
passage of the statute of repose will quickly point out that tradi-
tional manufacturers, most notably Cessna, are already moving.
back into the market by building new production lines and
working in the development of improved products. 175 The ques-
tion remains, however, whether Cessna's efforts are a product of
some optimistic view of the future for traditionally manufac-
tured single-engine planes or a function of political bargains
struck during and after the effort to pass the GARA.
E. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCENTIVES
It is difficult to believe that the primary sponsors of the relief
legislation did not strike some bargain with Cessna and the
other manufacturers to open new production facilities and pro-
vide new jobs as part of the package for their support. Even if
170 William J. Cook, The Takeoff in the Small Plane Market After Years on the
Ground, the Industry Looks Up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug. 21, 1995, at 50.
171 See, e.g., Philip Gold, A Time to Sue, a Time to fly, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 29,
1994, at A19.
17 See Interview with David Hinson, Administrator of the FAA, AIRPORT MAGAZINE,
Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 25.
173 See, e.g., Casey Gilmore, Preparing for Takeoff: Aviation Bill Will Mean
Thousands of Jobs, KA. CITY Bus. J., Aug. 26, 1994, at 1.
174 GAMA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 159. The traditional manufac-
turers face competition from foreign manufacturers and kit-plane firms.
175 Carton, supra note 46, at B1.
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explicit deals were not made, the decision for Cessna to reenter
the single-engine market was sweetened considerably by deals
with state and local governments that include free land, prop-
erty tax abatement, $20 million in cash, and subsidized worker
training programs.1 16 While this does not exclude the possibility
that Cessna is fully committed to the single-engine market seg-
ment, it does suggest that Cessna's success in this endeavor will
be shaped by more than tort reform.
F. NEw RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS
Other factors that may confound the analysis are likely to
stem from governmental efforts to give the industry an eco-
nomic boost. These efforts include a research and development
consortium headed by NASA that is concerned primarily with
developing and implementing new technologies, production
techniques, management skills, and marketing programs for
America's general aviation industry.17 As part of its Advanced
Subsonic Technology Program, NASA and member firms and
institutions joined together to create the Advanced General Avi-
ation Experiments or AGATE program. 7" This program was ini-
tiated by policy makers and industry representatives who
recognized that the industry needs more than just economic in-
centives, tort reform, and political favors to succeed. The pro-
gram seeks to bring NASA and the aviation research
communities' skills and experience to bear on the problems of
general aviation."7 9
It is too early to tell whether the consortium or its various
programs will produce positive results, but the concept is ap-
pealing since it recognizes the need to improve the technologies
in general aviation which have remained virtually unchanged or
only marginally improved over the last three decades. This pro-
gram also recognizes that products liability reform will likely to
be insufficient to revitalize the industry.
G. MARKETING INITIATIVES
Industry itself has also finally recognized that the statute of
repose is insufficient. Industry groups created programs over
176 Id.
177 NASA, GENERAL AVIATION TASK FORCE REPORT (Sept. 1993).
178 NASA, JOINT SPONSORED RESEARCH AGREEMEN1, AGATE ALLIANCE FOR AD-
VANCED GENERAL AVIATION TRANSPORT EXPERIMENTS (1994).
179 Id.
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the last few years to address what they believe is a critical demo-
graphic problem facing the industry and general aviation.180 Pi-
lots from the World War II cohort are slowly hanging up their
wings and no new group is emerging to replace them in the
market.181 The trials and tribulations of the industry through
the 1980s and into the 1990s left the general population with
the impression that aircraft are too expensive and potentially
dangerous. Wisely, the industry and its supporters are venturing
into schools and other places where they can sell the message
about the joy and, perhaps more importantly, the accessibility of
flying general aviation aircraft.182
Despite the rhetoric of the industry's tort reform lobbying ef-
fort, some representatives of the industry recognize that other
issues must be addressed if the traditional general aviation man-
ufacturers are to emerge from their current predicament.
GAMA President Edward Stimson notes that while "passage of
the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 was an impor-
tant step... implementation of FAA's Policy Statement and Ac-
tion Plan is equally important."1 8 3
VII. CONCLUSION
It is far too early to tell what will happen to the American
general aviation industry. Too many features of the industry are
up in the air to project effectively even the next few years. Need-
less to say, it would be beneficial to the nation's economic future
if the industry regains a healthy and productive position in the
general economy. The industry has the potential to serve as a
generator of new technologies and production techniques that
could be adopted by other industries. Moreover, the jobs associ-
ated with the development and production of aircraft are ex-
actly the kinds of jobs Americans desire.
On the subject of tort reform, the picture is much less clear.
Setting aside the important questions concerning the societal
180 See, e.g., Dick Koenig, Learn to ly Program, in General Aviation: Building for the
Future on its Strengths & Diversity, 4TH ANNUAL FAA GENERAL AVIATION FORECAST
AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 111 (1994); John Olcott, No Plane, No Gain, in
General Aviation Building for the Future on its Strengths & Diversity, 4TH ANNUAL FAA
GENERAL AVIATION FORECAST AND CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 97 (1994).
181 GAMA STATISTICAL HANDBOOK, supra note 175.
182 FAA FORECAST, supra note 144; see also RUBIN & VANDUZEE, supra note 142,
at 2-12 (discussing the industry's failure to market its products effectively in pre-
vious years).
183 Carton, supra note 46, at Bi.
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benefits of strong products liability laws, the question remains
whether tort reform will even achieve the desired results of re-
turning the general aviation industry to its former glory,
whether real or imagined.
The general aviation case not only fails to offer a solid case for
testing or experimenting with tort reform policies, it presents a
dangerous case. The battle over tort reform for the general avi-
ation industry was highly charged by the broader political and
economic questions surrounding it. Its high-profile character
makes it an excellent illustrative case for whichever side believes
it can get the most political mileage. If the industry fails to re-
bound and for whatever reason new single-engine aircraft expe-
rience some design or technical problems resulting in crashes,
tort reform efforts in other industries and sectors of the econ-
omy might be killed. On the other hand, if the industry re-
bounds and the new planes live up to expectations, supporters
of tort reform may incorrectly attribute the industry's success to
the reform effort and use the general aviation case as a cudgel
to force reform in other sectors of the economy.
If the industry fails to rebound it may be that statutes of re-
pose do not really work to stimulate business. But it could be
because the market changed sufficiently between the time the
lobbying effort began and the passage of the bill that the oppor-
tunity for revitalization of the traditional manufacturers was lost.
On the other hand, if the industry does rebound, it may be im-
possible to separate the positive impact of the various economic
incentives thrown at Cessna from the positive influence of the
tort reform effort. In either case, the conclusions are likely to
be muddied by other factors that condition the health and
shape of the industry.
There are many lessons to be learned from the experience of
the general aviation industry over the last two decades. It is criti-
cal that these lessons be drawn only after a careful consideration
of all relevant factors, notjust those that fit the political rhetoric
of the day. To do otherwise is to make bad policy and unneces-
sarily jeopardize America's legal and economic future.
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